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Abstract
This paper fi rst examines the process of the introduction and intensifi cation of wartime economic 
controls and the response of the private sector, specifi cally taking up the case of the machine 
tool industry and a controversy concerning state control over electric power.  Next, the concept 
of the “New Economic Order”, which was expected to play a primary role in breaking through 
the impasse of the wartime economy, as well as the transformation process with respect to 
competition among private firms, are discussed.  Lastly, the malfunctioning of the wartime 
planned economy is considered, along with the role of government in encouraging private fi rms 
to expand their production, focusing primarily on the Pacifi c War period.
Introduction
In comparing real personal consumption trends in Germany and Japan, the biggest losers of World 
War II, an impressive difference can be confirmed.  In both countries, real personal consumption 
declined continuously following the outbreak of the war.  In Nazi Germany, however, although the 
1944 fi gure had fallen to a level that was 73 per cent of that in 1939, it was still at least 20 per cent 
greater than during the Great Depression.  In contrast, real personal consumption in Japan in 1944 had 
declined to 61 per cent of the 1937 level, and it was below the level of the Great Depression as early 
as in 1940 (YAMAZAKI 1979, pp.52,?56) .
Regarding this situation, Takafusa NAKAMURA has suggested that, ‘Japan could support a long war in 
spite of its poor national strength, because policies aimed at endless reductions in the living standards 
of the nation were executed by force, and virtually the entire nation silently endured this burden’ 
(NAKAMURA 1977, p.157).  Meanwhile, interpreting the same situation, Ryôichi MIWA says that, ‘The 
social and political pressure which forced the nation to endure this burden might be called Japanese 
fascism. ... Japanese fascism functioned as a last resort for the unifi cation of the nation’s citizens at the 
limits of contemporary capitalism’ (MIWA, R. 1993, p.149) .
State legitimacy in wartime Japan, which was based on the Emperor system, was not openly 
criticized or challenged1, and the movement plotting the overthrow of the Hideki Tôjô Cabinet in 
1944 was limited to the sphere of the political elite.  Most ordinary people working in the private 
† Professor, Graduate?School of Economics, Osaka University
1? In this sense Freda Utley, who presented a brilliant analysis on Japanese industrial structure and international trade in 
the 1930s, seems to make a decisive mistake in her political prospect.  See Utley(1937).
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sector, from managers and white collar professionals to engineers, laborers, and farmers, seem to have 
obediently followed the government initiatives.
Needless to say, however, it would have been impossible to execute the wartime planned economy 
without any regard at all for private sector trends, despite the lack of political presence.  In this 
sense, even during the wartime period, ‘Planning was partially carried out on the precondition of a 
capitalistic market economy, and was regulated by its constraints... [and] controls that disregarded the 
laws of the market were not effective.  ... [E]ven in a distorted form the price mechanism still worked, 
and it was diffi cult to proceed with forcibly implemented controls that ignored it’ (HARA 1995, pp.85-
86).
This paper fi rst examines the process of the introduction and intensifi cation of wartime economic 
controls and the response of the private sector, specifically taking up the case of the machine tool 
industry and a controversy concerning state control over electric power.  Next, the concept of the “New 
Economic Order”, which was expected to play a primary role in breaking through the impasse of the 
wartime economy, as well as the transformation process with respect to competition among private 
firms, are discussed.  Lastly, the malfunctioning of the wartime planned economy is considered, 
along with the role of government in encouraging private fi rms to expand their production, focusing 
primarily on the Pacifi c War period.
1. The Intensifi cation of Wartime Economic Controls and the Response of the Private Sector
(1) The Intensifi cation of Wartime Economic Controls
The rapid increase of imports caused by the expansion of military spending after the attempted 
coupd'état on 26 February 1936 accelerated the crisis of Japan’s balance of payments, and inevitably 
caused the introduction of foreign exchange controls from January 1937.  Economic controls became 
full-scale immediately following the outbreak of war in China (referred to hereafter as the Japan-
China War) in July 1937.2
Initially, two important acts passed by the Diet in September 1937, the Temporary Measures on 
Imports and Exports Act and the Temporary Capital Adjustment Act, gave the government the right to 
exert direct control over international trade, all commodities, capital, and fi nancing.  At the same time 
the Diet allowed the government to apply the long-dormant 1918 Munitions Industry Mobilization 
Act to the Japan-China War.  By means of a subsidiary ordinance for authority over factories and 
establishments, the Army and the Navy began direct control of private major munitions factories 
from January 1938.  The number of factories controlled by the Army reached 359 (of which 202 were 
jointly controlled with the Navy) by July 1940, with the number controlled by the Navy reaching 
309 (198 were jointly controlled with the Army) by May 1941(SHIMOTANI 1990, pp.26-27).  At the 
inception of the system of factory control, private companies tended to be somewhat nervous about 
receiving the designation of “controlled factory”, meaning that offi cers on active duty would be sent 
in as supervisors. From 1938, however, when a prolonged war began to appear inevitable, private 
2? On the process of introduction and intensifi cation of wartime economic controls, see SAWAI(1996a) and HARA(1998).
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companies looking for military-orchestrated mediation and support for capital, materials, and labor 
began to distinctly prefer direct control (IDDA 1970, pp. 194-95).
The newly established Planning Board (Kikaku-In), created through the amalgamation of the 
Planning Offi ce and Resources Bureau in October 1937, began working on a Materials Mobilization 
Plan which allocated strategic commodities (supplied from domestic production, existing inventory, 
and imports) to the Army, the Navy, and to private demand.  The fi rst of what was to be a series of 
Materials Mobilization Plans was set up in January 1938.  The National General Mobilization Act, 
which gave the government the right to control almost all fields of economic activity, was passed 
by the Diet in March 1938.  Furthermore, various acts for the promotion of increased production in 
strategic industries such as aircraft and machine tools were enacted during the same Diet session.
The Four-Year Plan for Expansion of Production Capacity, which aimed at increased domestic 
production in strategic industries (fifteen industries in particular, including steel, coal, aluminum, 
automobiles, and machine tools), was started in 1939, and year-by-year execution plans for production 
capacity expansion were drafted.  In addition, through national general mobilization plans such as 
the mobilization and control plans for labor, transport, electricity, capital, and international trade, the 
government tried to artifi cially balance and adjust international payments and the markets for goods, 
capital, and labor (OKAZAKI 1994, pp.12-21).
The outbreak of World War II in September 1939, however, seriously impinged upon the 
management of the wartime planned economy that had been implemented thus far.  Imports from 
belligerents became much more diffi cult, and the quantity of imports which could be purchased with 
the diminishing stock of foreign currency shrank substantially due to global price increases.  The 
Materials Mobilization Plans had to be constantly revised under such conditions, and there was no 
choice but to cut down on allocation to the private sector in order to meet military demand as fully as 
possible.  This resulted in the further strengthening of controls, which was accompanied by expanded 
black market dealings; an economic security police system to crack down on violations had been 
already established in 1938.
(2) The Response of Private Sector (a): The Case of Machine Tool Industry
Let us examine the response of the private sector to the introduction and intensifi cation of economic 
controls during the war, taking the case of the machine tool industry.3  Invoking the Machine Tool 
Manufacturing Industry Act of July 1938, the government designated 16 producers in February 1939 
as licensed companies (equipped with 200 or more machine tools for manufacturing equipment, or 
50 or more in the case of those producing special machine tools) that would play a leading role in 
boosting the production of machine tools.  The licensed companies formed the Japan Association 
of Machine Tool Manufacturers, a national association of larger machine tool builders.  Middle-
ranking manufacturers who owned at least 20 machine tools located in the seven major machine 
tool manufacturing prefectures, meanwhile, were organized into the First Industrial Associations of 
3? For more on the details of the wartime machine tools industry and the economic controls pertaining to it, see 
SAWAI(1984), Friedman(1988), MIWA, Y.(1998), and SAWAI (2005).
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Machine Tool Manufacturers in each prefecture, with each prefectural association given membership 
in the National Federation of Industrial Associations of Machine Tool Manufacturers, while the 
smallest manufacturers were required to join the Second Industrial Associations of Machine Tool 
Manufacturers established in every relevant prefecture.
The licensed companies enjoyed privileged status, being exempted from taxes on income and 
profits, local taxes, and from duties on imported machines.  Increased production by licensed 
companies, however, was not realized to the extent that the government had expected.  The ratio of the 
units of machine tools built by the Japan Association of Machine Tool Manufacturers and the National 
Federation of Industrial Associations of Machine Tool Manufacturers was 14-86 (27-73 in terms of 
value) in fi scal 1939, and 23-77 (41-59 in value) even in the fi scal 1941 (SAWAI 1984, p.162).
The licensed companies who had experienced “feast or famine” several times in the past hesitated 
to proceed with large scale equipment investments in spite of strong requests from the government.  In 
response to an inquiry from the Navy directed to the fi ve major companies (Ikegai Tekkôjo, Karatsu 
Tekkôjo, Niigata Tekkôjo, Ôkuma Tekkôjo, and Tokyo Gasu Denki Kôgyô) just before an enactment 
of the Machine Tool Manufacturing Industry Act, Ôkuma Tekkôjo answered, ‘We have already 
expanded our capacity as much as possible at present, and we cannot continue.  The supportive 
legislation is not of particular benefi t to our company.’  Meanwhile Karatsu Tekkôjo stated, ‘Large 
manufacturers, who have already carried out large-scale investments, cannot benefi t from the Act.’ 
Each major company expected the government to promise demand in the range of 35 to 50 per cent of 
their production capacity as collateral for equipment investments in the near future.4
According to the recollection of a staff member who worked at Tokyo Gasu Denki Kôgyô, although 
the competition for licensed company designation among the second-class manufacturers was 
severe, for the fi rst-class manufacturers represented by the fi ve major companies, the Machine Tool 
Manufacturing Industry Act was ‘... of no signifi cance at all.  Just reports to the government...  We 
had to explain everything in detail to the officials dispatched from the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, and deliver the reports.  In short, we just got busier with paperwork.  The real situation was 
that we did not need such legislation.’  Concerning the exemption of tax, the same source indicates 
that, ‘It was too complicated and troublesome.  Everyone said we didn’t need such exemptions [in the 
fi rst place] and preferred not to have them.  Since the company was making money hand over fi st, we 
thought that we ought to be paying more tax.’5
In order to allocate substantially more machine tools to munitions-related machine industries 
like armaments, the distribution of machine tools built by manufacturers organized in the Japan 
Association of Machine Tool Manufacturers and the National Federation of Industrial Associations of 
Machine Tool Manufacturers was brought under strict government control with the promulgation in 
July 1938 of the Regulation Concerning Restriction of Machine Tool Supply.  It was not the armament 
industry, however, but the machine tool industry itself that installed the largest number of machine 
4? The Fifth Director of Naval Vessels Headquarters, Kôsakukikai Nôritsu Zôshin oyobi Kakujû Seisaku (Promotion of the 
Effi ciency of Machine Tools and a Policy for Expansion), 1939, the National Archives.  
5? Author’s interview with Mr. Shôkichi Miyazaki, 10 November 1992.
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tools during the years from 1937 to 1939.
Although the Materials Mobilization Plans had consistently given priority to military arsenals and 
munitions-related machine industries such as armaments and aircraft in the allocation of machine 
tools on a value basis, vast numbers of machine tools had been delivered to the machine tool industry 
itself out of step with the Materials Mobilization Plan.  Compared with Germany or the US, this 
situation reflected the relative backwardness in the production capacity of the Japanese machine 
tool industry, which could not merely change its customers on the basis of previous production 
levels but had to fi rmly establish and enlarge itself to meet requests from the military, which eagerly 
hoped for intensive and rapid equipment investments in the munitions-related machine industries to 
cover accelerated wartime replacement needs.  It was the large volume of cheap machine tools built 
by the smallest manufacturers organized into the Second Industrial Associations of Machine Tool 
Manufacturers (which were not targeted by the Regulation Concerning Restriction of Machine Tool 
Supply) that covered for the overall backwardness of the machine tool industry.
The technological level of products manufactured by increased numbers of small and very small 
manufacturers, however, could not meet the requirements for upgrading presented by wartime 
demand, giving rise to the situation where their products were severely criticized as wasting valuable 
materials in the face of increased shortages of resources.  The Regulation Concerning Restriction of 
Machinery and Equipment promulgated in September 1939 therefore not only prohibited new entrants 
into the machine tool industry, but also applied strict government controls to the distribution of the 
products of the smallest manufacturers who were exempted from the provisions of the Regulation 
Concerning Restriction of Machine Tool Supply (SAWAI 1984, pp.165-67).
Paralleled with above-mentioned control policies on increased production and distribution, the 
Rules Concerning Subsidies for Trial Manufacture of Machine Tools promulgated in August 1938 
should be noted as a technological policy for the machine tool industry.  During the fiscal years 
from 1938 to 1941, 50 trial projects conducted by 40 companies to pursue substitute manufacture 
of high quality imported machine tools were provided with subsidies.  Trial manufacturing meant 
the time-consuming copying of imported machines based on reverse engineering, and only 18 of the 
50 projects were completed by the end of May 1942 (KAWASAKI 1943, p.169).  The paucity of the 
results of the subsidy system for trial manufacturing, which was based on voluntary application by 
the manufacturers themselves, inspired severe criticism.  ‘Manufacturers prefer the production of 
machines that make large profi ts, as prices are about ten thousand yen while production costs are only 
one or two thousand yen, to the diffi cult trial manufacture that requires much valuable labor.  The 
subsidy policy is showing hardly any effects at all’ (Planning Board 1941, p.12).
In order to upgrade machine tool quality, the government strongly encouraged private manufacturers 
to change their production systems from small-batch  production of a wide variety of items to mass 
production of only a few types of items.  This policy was also ineffective, as shown by Niigata 
Tekkôjo’s reply to the previous inquiry from the Navy: ‘We suppose that rushed orders at this busy 
time would naturally help manufacturers concentrate on their favorite fields of production, but if 
recession [later] attacks the industry, the fi elds of production by company would become disordered.’ 
OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS Vol.60 No.1??6?
An important factor in the delayed reductions in the types of machines manufactured was the failure 
of coordination of orders within the government, in particular between the Army and the Navy. 
Karatsu Tekkôjo, for example, which had already manufactured or executed trial manufacture of 
88 types of machine tools by July 1942, applied to the Precision Machinery Control Association 
(established in January 1942 through the amalgamation of associations such as the Japan Association 
of Machine Tool Manufacturers and the National Federation of Industrial Associations of Machine 
Tool Manufacturers) for permission to produce 16 additional types in May 1943.  The reason given 
was that, ‘Manufacture of the additional types has mostly been demanded by the military and by 
private companies equipping themselves with machine tools through military mediation.’6
(3) The Response of the Private Sector (b): State Control of Electric Power
A fierce controversy between bureaucrats and the private sector arose concerning state control of 
electric power during the Japan-China War.  The inception of the problem was the emergence of a 
plan drawn up by the Investigative Bureau of the Cabinet aiming at state control of electric power 
in March 1936.7   A controversy had been continued mainly between bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
Communications and the private electric power companies.  Backing the Ministry of Communications, 
the Army insisted that, ‘State control is indispensable from the viewpoint of national defense’ (Asahi 
1938, p.398), while economic organizations such as local chambers of commerce, the Japan Economic 
League, and the National Federation of Industrial Organizations made up a counterforce.
Although the bills authorizing state control of electric power, which represented the realization 
of a draft by Minister of Communications Keikichi Tanomogi (whose plan was modeled after the 
plan of the Investigative Bureau of the Cabinet), were introduced in the 70th Diet in January 1937, 
they did not pass the Diet due to political change.  Again in November of the same year a temporary 
committee on electric power organized under newly appointed Minister of Communications Ryûtarô 
Nagai submitted a report, which followed the content of Tanomogi’s plan, and the bills based on 
this report (the Nagai plan) were introduced in the 73rd Diet in January 1938.  This issue was hotly 
debated in the Diet, but legislation for the state control of electric power was at last passed in March. 
Nihon Hassôden (i.e., electric generation and transmission) Company, or the national policy company, 
was then established in April 1939, taking over equipment for thermal power generation, main 
transmission, and transformation from existing private electric power companies.
State control of electric power was thus established despite severe opposition from business circles 
insisting that, ‘This legislation is supported by the new ideology of bureaucrats who want to proceed 
with controls for the sake of controls, and is aimed at state socialism’ (Asahi 1938, p.397).  Regarding 
the situation when the bills were passed, a contemporary researcher for a life insurance company 
6? Notice from the Precision Machinery Control Association to Karatsu Ironworks, Kôsakukikai Seisan Bunya no Kakutei 
ni Kansuru Siji no Ken (On the Instruction Concerning the Determination of the Types of Production of Machine Tools), 
29 July 1942, and an Application from Karatsu Ironworks to the Precision Machinery Control Association, Seisan Bunya 
Kakutei Kishugai Tuika Shônin Shinseisho (An Application for Additional Production Except Determined Types of 
Production), 8 May 1943.
7? On the details of the controversy on state control of electric power, see Nakase(1994) and Kikkawa(1995, pp. 203-05.).
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suggested in his report that, ‘Not only the electric power companies who have been totally against 
the state control of the electrical power, approving of the working of self-governing controls, but also 
[more general] resistance led by business circles, securities corporations, and industrial organizations 
protesting on the grounds that it would undermine policies for production capacity expansion, have at 
last been defeated. ... It is as yet unclear whether such obligatory investment will be generalized over 
every industry, and the package of private ownership and state control utilized as a general method of 
economic control in the future’ (YAMANAKA 1990 pp.16-17).
From the beginning, however, the state control of the electric power, advocating an ‘plentiful supply 
of cheap electric power,’ failed to effectively deal with the severe shortage of electric power caused 
by the continued drought and shortage of coal from the second half of 1939 to the fi rst half of 1940. 
On the reasons for the shortage of electric power, harsh words were exchanged between bureaucrats 
of the Ministry of Communications and the private electric power companies, and the former again 
won a victory.  By April 1942 hydroelectric power stations owned by the private companies were 
required to be turned over to the Nihon Hassôden Company.  State control was thereby completed, 
with all equipment for electric power under the control of the company, and with nine power supply 
companies being organized by region.
2. The New Economic Order and the Transformation of Competition
(1) The Controversy Over Article 11 of the National General Mobilization Act
Paralleled with the contention over the state control of electric power, antagonism between business 
circles and the government (i.e., the military in particular) emerged when the issue of the application 
of Article 11 of the National General Mobilization Act came to a head in November 1938.  The 
beginning of this antagonism occurred when Home Affairs Minister Nobumasa Suetsugu and the 
Health and Welfare Minister Kôichi Kido strongly insisted in a discussion concerning the National 
General Mobilization Act at a cabinet meeting on November 4 that it was irrational not to impose 
Article 11, concerning limitations on dividends and orders for forced loans and forced public bond 
purchases by fi nancial institutions, if direct control of labor was to be executed by means of Article 
6 (Osaka Asahi, 8 November 1938).  At the cabinet meeting on November 8, Shigeaki Ikeda,8 who 
held the portfolios of Finance and Commerce and Industry and served as a proponent of business 
interests (but who had been absent from the meeting four days earlier), wrangled with Suetsugu on 
this topic.  Ikeda announced that night that, ‘The business world would atrophy if limitations on 
dividends were introduced, largely impeding the accomplishment of the important goal of production 
capacity expansion. ... Orders to fi nancial institutions to execute forced loans, even when backed by 
government guarantees, would cause much unrest and anxiety among third parties, undermining trust, 
which is the very foundation of fi nancial institutions’ (Osaka Asahi, 9 November 1938).
These comments sparked immediate opposition from the Army, with the director of the Information 
Bureau of the Army, Kenryô Satô, stating that, ‘It is not appropriate to think on the basis of profi t-
8? Ikeda was a leader of the business world, who had held such posts as general manager of the holding company of the 
Mitsui zaibatsu, and president of the Bank of Japan, etc.
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making.  Guidance and control of enterprise and fi nance should be conducted on the basis of the State 
and its policies; of course, pursuit of profi t should not be prohibited, and excessive and unnecessary 
intervention should be avoided.  In particular, however, we oppose high rates of dividends in 
prosperous industries, out of consideration for the situation of depressed industries and the families 
of war dead’ (Osaka Asahi, 10 November 1938).  The aforementioned life insurance company 
researcher was shocked at this statement and wrote, ‘If it [implementation of Article 11] were taken 
to the extreme, the risk would arise of a package of private ownership and state control of fi nancial 
institutions’ (Yamanaka 1990,p.29).  Meanwhile, stock prices plunged.
Prior to his appointment as director of the Information Bureau, Kenryô Satô had been involved with 
the mobilization of industries in his position in the Purchasing Bureau of the Ministry of the Army, and 
had experienced reluctance by managers of private companies to invest in and expand their facilities 
in order to increase weapons production after the outbreak of the Japan-China War.  They typically 
refused, despite his eager requests.  Their reason was that, ‘Bankruptcy will be unavoidable when the 
war comes to an end and orders from the military are abruptly halted, after vast amounts of money 
have been invested in expansion of equipment at the behest of guidance from the military’ (Tokyo 12th 
Channel 1969, p.214).  For Satô, who was dissatisfi ed with the attitude of the private companies to the 
total war, there was the stark recognition that there was little prospect of the war ending in the near 
future, and even in the postwar years an expansion in armaments for future war with Russia would be 
needed.  This knowledge fueled his strong intentions to force the private sector to make the requisite 
investments in equipment in order to respond to the situation at hand (MATSUURA 1995, p.215).
Ikeda, who was thoroughly against the moves being pursued by the Army, dispatched Hisatsune 
Sakomizu, a section chief in the Ministry of Finance, to negotiate.  In the end a compromise was set 
up, partly through the support of Kazuo Aoki, deputy chief of the Planning Board, who was able to 
refute Hideki Tôjô, then deputy minister of the Army, saying, ‘We cannot win over industry if the 
military is going to take this kind of stance’ (MOF 1978, pp.459-61).  A statement from the Ministry 
of Finance was announced to the effect that it was not desirable for companies paying a dividend of 
ten per cent or more to raise it, and that the issue of loans was under discussion.
(2) The New Economic Order
The controversy over Article 11 was, however, just a preliminary skirmish between business circles 
and the government.  As previously noted, the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 seriously 
interfered with the management of the wartime planned economy, even as the strategic situation on 
the continent got bogged down from that same year.  In spite of the continuous intensification of 
economic controls, the Japanese economy was facing a dead end.
It was Nihon Keizai no Saihensei (Reorganization of the Japanese Economy, first published in 
December 1939)9 by Shintarô Ryû that attracted public attention as a prescription for the deadlocked 
Japanese economy.  Ryû, whose conclusion was in a sense very simple and clear, argued that, 
9? Ryû(1939), this book went through 44 printings by October 1940.
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‘Establishment of a new economic order requires the business world to retake the initiative.  The 
economy should be driven not by controls but by the autonomous actions of the business world. ... In 
order to escape from the contradiction of two forces, the profi t motive and the power of controls, that 
are inconsistently driving the economy, the shape of one dimension should be established, and the 
schizophrenic discord of efforts to control and efforts to resist control should be merged into a new 
economic order’ (Ryû 1939, p.3).
Plans subsequently emerged for this kind of new economic order, essentially the realization of 
Ryu’s ideas, drafted by the Planning Board under the second Konoe Cabinet established in June 
1940.10  Various proposals were drawn up from July, mainly by reformist ‘new bureaucrats’ such as 
Planning Board members Yôji Minobe, Hisatsune Sakomizu, and Hideoto Môri, with the focus of 
their ideas being ‘separation of ownership and management’ in private fi rms and a shift of the purpose 
of enterprises ‘from a profi t orientation to a production orientation.’  In other words, their plans were 
aimed at freeing managers from the intervention of shareholders and encouraging consciousness of 
the public goals for private fi rms so as to push forward with increased production.
The business world began to energetically resist to these ideas from September when plans for 
‘separation of ownership and management’ were announced in the press.  The ‘business offensive’ 
continued through December, giving rise to heated controversy between the government and the 
private sector.  Minister of Commerce and Industry Ichizô Kobayashi opposed the idea of ‘separation 
of ownership and management,’ going so far as to call for the resignation of Vice-Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Nobusuke Kishi, who was known as a leader of the new bureaucrats. 
‘The outline for the establishment of a new economic order’ was decided at the cabinet meeting of 
December 7, but it was a product of compromise between business interests and the new bureaucrats. 
The content was substantially watered down from the initial Planning Board proposals, as illustrated 
by the expression ‘enterprises, which are organic entities of capital, management, and labor.’11
The decision at the cabinet meeting, however, became the basis of an Edict Concerning Major 
Industrial Organizations in August 1941.  The Iron and Steel Control Association was established 
by this edict in November 1941, followed by the setting up of various kinds of control associations 
thereafter, eventually numbering 33 in 23 industries (11 control associations having been established 
in the finance industry) by the beginning of 1943 (Control Association 1943).  The presidents of 
the control associations, which organized almost all large and medium-sized companies in each 
industry, were supposed to be given a wide range authority to control member companies on the 
basis of ‘principles of leadership’, modeled on Nazi Germany.  The government aimed at smoother 
management of the wartime economy, using control associations as government-industry intermediates 
which were better informed of the actual situations in the private sector than the bureaucrats.  The 
main tasks of control associations were to allocate production along with labor and material resources 
to the member companies in accordance with the national general mobilization plans, and to monitor 
10?For details on the controversy concerning the new economic order, see NAKAMURA AND HARA (1972, pp. 88-106).
11? In his recollection just after the end of the Pacifi c War, Yôji Minobe stated that ‘The larger part of the targets for the 
establishment of the new economic order was lost’ by the decision at the cabinet meeting (MINOBE n. d. a, p. 17. ).
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production performance.  Bureaucrats from the Planning Board had begun discussions with the Army 
and the Navy to organize factories under the direct control of the military into control associations 
just after the cabinet meeting of December 1940, but this version of their plans was not brought to 
fruition (MINOBE n. d. b, pp.5-6).  The activities of the control associations as a whole became less and 
less signifi cant as the Pacifi c War continued, while the Iron and Steel Control Association functioned 
relatively well due to the small number of member companies and the position of giant Nippon Steel 
Company at the core of the industry.
(3)  The Transformation of Competition: From Price Competition to Competition for Designation 
and Rating
Through the process of the intensification of wartime economic controls and the attempt at 
reorganization of the wartime planned economy, competition among private companies was largely 
transformed.  Price controls introduced just after the outbreak of the Japan-China War were extended 
to the establishment of Price Committees (both central and local) in April 1938 by the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, and to the start of an official price system based on the Regulation 
Concerning Sales Prices of Commodities in July 1938.12  World War II broke out just after the August 
announcement of the implementation of the content of the ‘Outline of Price Controls,’ a report of 
the Central Price Committee which aimed at the introduction of a wider offi cial price system with 
the target of the reduction of domestic prices to the level of international prices.  In the response to 
this new situation, the government fi xed prices in general and pegged wages, salaries, and rents for 
land and accommodation to the level of September 18 by means of the Price Control Act enforced 
in October 1939.  A pooling system for prices was also introduced, which was intended to promote 
increased production at private firms by offering subsidies to strategic industries such as coal and 
steel.
The scope of price controls continued to expand thereafter, and by the spring of 1941 the number 
of offi cial prices reached 47,607 items at the central level and 429,822 items at the local level (Asahi 
1941, p. 135).  In parallel with the intensifi cation of price controls, there was also a rapid increase 
in the number of economic crimes, i.e., violations.  As a result of a crackdown by the economic 
security police, some 2,250,572 persons were accused of economic crimes from July 1938 to October 
1939.  Of these, some 2,004,443 were let off with a ‘caution,’ 218,987 given an ‘admonition,’ 1,174 
presented with a ‘reprimand,’ and 25,968 ‘sent to prosecution’ (NISHIDA 1994, pp.375-76).
The extent of the arena in which price competition could be undertaken was therefore subject 
to steadily curtailment, and competition among private fi rms became the focused instead upon the 
acquisition of status for designation as being the target of policies making priority allocations of 
valuable resources to the private sector.  The above-noted competition for designation as militarily-
controlled factories, or for designation as licensed companies among the lower-tier manufacturers in 
the machine tool industry, foreshadowed the transformation of competition during the war.
12?On the details of price control policies during the Japan-China War, see MITI (1964, pp. 282-306, 331-54).
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During the Pacific War, competition for acquiring designation was accelerated throughout every 
quarter of the Japanese economy.  November 1943 saw the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions 
through the amalgamation of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Planning Board in an 
effort to set up a system for increased aircraft production, while the Munitions Companies Act, under 
which all major munitions-related companies were to be totally controlled by the government, was 
enacted at the same time.  The number of munitions companies eventually reached a total of 721 
companies, starting with an initial designation of 150 companies in January 1944, and continuing 
with a subsequent designation of 424 companies in April 1944 and an additional 147 companies from 
June 1944 to May 1945 (IBJ 1957, p.555).  Here as well, since designated munitions companies could 
expect preferential allotment of resources, competition for acquiring designation was accelerated as 
indicated by the contemporary comment that, ‘Designation as a munitions company is considered to 
be a privilege and has become a matter of petition to the government’ (TAKAMIYA 1944, pp.10-11).
The same situation could be confirmed within financial organizations.  Plans originally mapped 
out by the Planning Board for a financial system in line with the new economic order called for 
preferential allotment of funds to strategic industries at high risk, even at the cost of undermining 
principles of sound banking.  However, resistance by the Bank of Japan and the private banks resulted 
in the conversion of these plans to an enlargement of a joint loan system, which thereafter formed 
the mainstream of the wartime indirect fi nance system (YAMAZAKI, S. 1991b, pp.454-61 and OKAZAKI 
1994, pp.26-27).
While trying to maintain and reinforce their positions as ‘main banks’ to zaibatsu subsidiaries by 
raising their ratios of loans to same-zaibatsu fi rms on one hand, ‘Participation in joint loans became an 
important business strategy for the city banks in order to maintain and acquire customers’ (BOJ 1984, 
p.301).   Such participation was also desirable in terms of dispersing the risks of munitions-related 
fi nancing.  Competition for share of loans shifted towards competition for participation in joint loans, 
and designation-centered competition got going in earnest at the January 1944 inception of a system 
of designated fi nancial institutions to meet the funding needs of munitions companies (MIYAZAKI and 
ITÔ 1989, p.202).
Once prices were fixed at the official levels, price competition sometimes transformed into 
competition for upgrading of rating from a certain price status to a higher level.  Price controls for 
machine tools started with lathes in January 1940, for example, and there were price differentials of 
one or two thousand yen among the three rated classes of knee-type milling machines of the same 
size (JMTBA 1962, pp.213-15).  This induced a rush of applications from concerned companies to the 
Precision Machinery Control Association for upgraded ratings.13
3. Disorder in the Wartime Planned Economy and the Reintroduction of Economic Incentives
(1) The Road Back to Economic Incentives
As shown above, the industrial mobilization system based on control associations started shortly after 
13?As an example, see Yoneda Tekkôjo, Kakuage Shinseisho (An Application of Upgrading of Rating), Osaka: 1942.
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the beginning of the Pacific War, a product of compromise to settle the controversy over the new 
economic order.  The activities of these control associations were, however, gradually undermined by 
the expansion of the industrial associations organized by the military itself.
At the request of the Army Weaponry Headquarters, the Weapons Industry Association, which 
organized at its core the major munitions-related companies (including Army-controlled factories), 
was established in May 1940.14  The association was composed of sections for guns, shells, 
tanks, steel, chemicals, etc., with the number of sections being constantly increased.  Cooperative 
associations were set up in turn under each section, made up of medium-sized and small factories. 
The Army established the Aircraft Industry Association under the direct control of the Aircraft 
Headquarters in November 1942, and this had fi ve internal sub-associations.  Meanwhile, starting with 
the establishment of the Machine Tool Industry Association in September 1941, the Navy also set up 
some 30 varieties of industry-specifi c associations, including the area of aircraft.
In response to the attempt at unifi cation of policies on aircraft between the Army and the Navy that 
stemmed from the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions, the respective bodies were merged 
into a single industrial association for aircraft in January 1944.  At the beginning, this association was 
composed of 14 sub-industrial associations such as those for fuselages and engines, with sub-industrial 
associations having 76 subordinate sections.  The number of member companies in the new Aircraft 
Industry Association rapidly increased from about 800 at inception to some 2,500 by July 1944, and 
was eventually intended to reach 10,000 in the end.  As the two branches of the military moved to 
capture the major munitions-related companies (which were also the core of control associations) with 
advance payments and the preferential supply of raw materials, the effectiveness of the corresponding 
civilian-managed control associations were substantially hollowed out.
Through the activities of the industrial associations and the designations awarded to companies 
producing war materiel, the individual relationships between private companies and the military 
became much more direct and intimate.  Co-opting munitions and other strategic companies with huge 
amounts of orders,15 advance payments, and raw materials, the military urged the private companies 
to promote increased production.  In turn, the major companies attempted, with a portion of these 
resources, to secure exclusive access to suppliers and labor to meet their production commitments. 
This attempt at what might be called carrot-based hegemony by the military over large private 
companies and by the large companies over smaller ones prevailed throughout the Japanese economy 
in the last stage of the war, giving rise to the coexistence of ‘scarcity’ and ‘surplus’ of resources and as 
a result of disorder in the wartime ‘planned’ economy.
The disorder of the wartime planned economy also showed up in price policies.  The government 
had already attempted to increase production by introducing a pooling system for prices based on 
subsidies for strategic materials such as coal and steel, and the ‘Outline of Emergency Measures on 
14?The following description of industrial associations of the military is based on SAWAI(1992, pp. 169-170). On the 
details of transformation of the mobilization system of industries from control associations to the industrial associations 
by the military, see YAMAZAKI, S.(1991a).
15?The backlog of orders at 63 ‘important’ factories in the machine tool industry at the end of March 1943 had reached 9.9 
times of production capacity estimated for fi scal 1943 (SAWAI, 1996b, p. 3.).
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Prices’ decided at a cabinet meeting in February 1943, which introduced large increases in the prices 
of strategic goods, a dual price system based on price-control subsidies, and an incentive system for 
increased production, was a watershed in terms of deviation from the previous low-price policies (HARA 
1994, p.96).
The change in price policies emerged not only in production prices but in wages.  The content of 
wage controls had been complicated after the proclamation of the Wage Control Act in March 1939, 
but during the Pacifi c War a crucial change in wage controls was executed in order to promote the 
mobilization of labor to strategic industries.  The Labor Control Act Concerning Important Factories 
enacted in February 1942 not only excluded the designated important factories from application of 
the Wage Control Act but also requested managers of those factories to raise salaries and wages of all 
employees without exception once a year, showing the amount of pay raise beforehand.  Furthermore, 
through revision of the Wage Control Act in July 1943, the Five Major Industries (steel, coal, light 
metals, shipbuilding, and aircraft), together with related factories and mines were also enabled to 
freely decide their own wages subject to approval under the rules for wages and pay raises (Asahi 
1944, p.99 and SUMIYA 1967, pp. 265, 269).  The revision of the Wage Control Act was a part of 
transition to new price policies which induced the reintroduction of economic incentives.
However, as long as the shortage of vessels continued (that is, the decline of shipping capacity, 
which was the biggest constraint on the performance of the Japanese economy), even the introduction 
and enlargement of such economic incentives could not possibly recover the drop in wartime 
production.  The shortage of commodities in the latter half of the Pacifi c War was compounded by the 
grabbing of resources by the military and the munitions companies located at the core of the wartime 
‘planned’ economy, and these attempts at hoarding extended not only to munitions-related supplies but 
to the necessities of daily life as well.  The price of consumer goods soared as a result of purchase at 
the source by the military and the munitions companies, which had abundant funds and transportation 
capacity, giving rise to expansionary black market dealings (NISHIDA 1994, pp.387-94).  Even in 
transactions of intermediate and capital goods between firms, official prices were often neglected 
(goods were bartered in some cases) and, in order to procure equipment and machinery, prospective 
users often had no other choice but to go to the military for help, hoping for effective mediation. 
During the fi nal stage of the Pacifi c War, then, ‘Black market dealings had already ceased to be black 
market dealings. ... The criminal had already ceased to be a criminal’ (KIYOSAWA 1980, p.311).
(2) The Role of Government in Equipment Investment by Munitions-Related Companies
During the Pacific War, of course, equipment investment in major private companies in strategic 
industries continued.  These companies, however, did not necessarily raise all the necessary funds 
themselves.  Although it was impossible for the managers of private companies to discuss the 
‘postwar’ situation in public, they had to consider it in the context of decision-making regarding huge 
investments in plant and equipment.  Accordingly, continued expansion of production capacity could 
not be realized unless the government acted to reduce private sector anxiety over the future.
Of the various governmental means of alleviating such worries, the most significant lay in the 
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activities of the Industrial Equipment Corporation (established in December 1941) and in special 
support to the munitions companies originating in the  Special Aid Act for Munitions Business (enacted 
in February 1942).
The main tasks of the Industrial Equipment Corporation were, (1) construction and leasing to 
private companies of emergency industrial plants and shipyards which were diffi cult for the companies 
themselves to construct and maintain, and (2) purchase, reserve, conversion and application, and 
mediation of idle plant and equipment.  The idea was to go ahead with a large amount of plant and 
equipment investment concerning which the private sector alone could only hesitate, and to promote 
the mobilization of idle resources emerging from the curtailment of civilian industries into use by 
strategic industries.  The value of emergency industrial plant and equipment and shipyards constructed 
during the Pacifi c War reached about 1.6 billion yen and 614 million yen respectively (both in terms 
of value of payment), led by that for the chemical industry (509 million yen), the fuel industry (447 
million yen), and the aircraft industry (265 million yen)(MOF 1962, pp.769-75).
Let us examine the case of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., as an example of plant and equipment 
investment based on the method of the Industrial Equipment Corporation.16  In addition to the total of 
101 million yen in expenditure for new plant and equipment leading up through the seventh phase of 
expansion during the Pacifi c War, Furukawa planned to proceed with the eighth phase construction 
of the Hiratsuka and Oyama plants, the last project during the war years based on the methods of the 
Industrial Equipment Corporation.  According to the contract between Furukawa and the Corporation 
at the end of 1943 for the construction of the Oyama plant, the company was to undertake construction 
on behalf of the Corporation, and to receive construction payments of 222 million yen following 
completion by the end of March 1945.  During the fi ve years after completion the company would 
lease the facility from the Corporation, paying a fee for use, although the company was to provide 
the plant sites free of charge to the Corporation.  In reality the company received 55 million yen in 
construction payments by April 1945.
Similarly, Furukawa contracted with the Corporation at the end of January 1945 for the construction 
of the Hiratsuka plant, with planned construction payments of 216 million yen, although only 23 
million yen was actually received.  Furukawa president Suekichi Nakagawa clearly distinguished the 
seventh phase, executed on his own risk, from the eighth phase, which the military strongly urged.  As 
the latter was a national project, beyond the scope of the company, it is assumed that he intended to 
avoid the risk engendered by excessive expansion of assets.
Special support to munitions manufacturers (those making weapons, naval vessels, parts, etc.) based 
on the Special Aid Act for Munitions Business consisted of (1) construction of plant and equipment by 
the government, assignment to private companies, and management by the latter (state ownership and 
private control) and (2) government orders to private companies for expanded plant and equipment, 
with the assurance of subsequent government purchase of the expanded portion (MOF 1957, p.318). 
As examples of this kind of aid, paid through a special temporary military account affi liated with the 
16?The following description is based on IJBH (1991, pp. 348-49).
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Army, it was planned for the Kumamoto plant of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. to receive 130 
million yen in fiscal 1943 for production of 80 large airframes per month, and for the company’s 
Shizuoka plant to receive 38 million yen in fi scal 1943/44 for monthly production of 270 large aircraft 
engines (MOF 1955, pp.255-56).  Support from the Industrial Equipment Corporation to Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, which was a symbol of industrial capability in wartime Japan, paralleled with other 
companies like Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd., was enormous.  The Corporation provided MHI 
alone with the some 700 million yen in funding for construction of 18 machine manufacturing plants 
and shipyards (SHIBA 1987, p.54).17
The Munitions Companies Act conferred the status of government officials on the presidents 
of designated munitions companies, while all employees were ordered to follow the directives of 
presidents.  In this sense government controls reached into the management of private companies.  At 
the same time, however, the munitions companies were promised not only preferential allotment of 
materials, funds, and labor, but also subsidies, compensation for losses, and guaranteed profi ts (Asahi 
1944, pp.19-22), thereby accelerating competition over designation of munitions company status. 
During the fi nal stage of the Pacifi c War, private companies eagerly sought this designation in order to 
continue their business fi rst of all, and next to the minimize the unmentionable diffi culties that were 
sure to arise later.
Conclusion
Until the halt of economic relationships with the Allied Powers in 1941, Japan, long since fi ghting 
with China, needed to maintain normal international trade in order to carry on with total war.  In 
this sense, the wartime planned economy was fi rmly supported by the peacetime economy, and this 
was the reason for the curious coexistence of ‘self-governing controls’ by the private sector and 
‘bureaucratic controls’ by the government.  When this style of management of the national economy 
came to an impasse, a plan for a ‘new economic order’ emerged, aiming at the ‘reorganization of the 
Japanese economy’ by means of ‘truly autonomous controls as a new system having evolved beyond 
self-governing controls and bureaucratic controls’ (YAMANAKA 1990, p.154).
As soon as the Japanese economy shifted to a closed economy as a result of the outbreak of the 
Pacifi c War, the domains regulated by ‘self-governing controls’ were quickly narrowed.  Resources 
transported from the ‘Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia’ to Japan proper, and available 
shipping capacity to ferry them came to be the dominant factor infl uencing the performance of the 
Japanese economy.  Although industrial mobilization based on control associations led by ‘principles 
of leadership’ was looked to as the key to resolving the overall economic dead end, such activity 
was gradually undermined by the hoarding of shrinking resources by the military, as well as by 
the expanded industrial associations directly affi liated with the military itself.  As a result, the co-
existence of ‘scarcity’ and ‘surplus’ of resources became palpable throughout the Japanese economy, 
disordering the wartime ‘planned’ economy from the inside.
17?The fi gure of 700 million yen represents contracted value, and not actual payments.
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The reintroduction of economic incentives was then attempted so as to more effectively mobilize 
the private sector.  Under these conditions private companies hotly competed with each other for the 
acquisition of designation and the upgrade of rating in order to maintain their business, while also 
seeking to avoid the risk involved in the over-expansion of plant and equipment.  Even during the last 
stage of the Pacifi c War, economic principles dominated the behavior of the private companies, albeit 
in a somewhat concealed fashion. 
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